Abstract. In this paper, we present discrete fixed point theorems. They are based on monotonicity of the mapping. We apply them to a non-cooperative n-person game and give an existence theorem of a Nash equilibrium of pure strategies. As a special case, we consider bimatrix games.
INTRODUCTION
Fixed point theorems are powerful tools not only in mathematics but also in economics. Existence theorem of a Nash equilibrium is one of the most important applications of fixed point theorems such as Brouwer's, Kakutani's, and so on. The aims of this paper are to provide discrete fixed point theorems and to apply them to a non-cooperative n-person game.
There are three types of discrete fixed point theorems. In 1955, Tarski [9] proved a lattice-theoretical fixed point theorem. It asserts that any increasing mapping defined on a complete lattice has a fixed point. Recently, Shih and Dong [4] proved that a mapping from the n-dimensional hypercube {0, 1} n to itself has the property that all the Boolean eigenvalues of the discrete Jacobian matrix of each element of the hypercube are zero, then it has a unique fixed point. Their result is an answer to a combinatorial version of the Jacobian conjecture. Further, Richard [8] extended Shih-Dong's fixed point theorem to the product of n finite intervals of integers of cardinality ≥ 2. On the other hand, Iimura-Murota-Tamura [2] gave a fixed point theorem on an integrally convex set by using Brower's fixed point theorem, and Yang [10] obtained some extensions, see Section 4 for details. Our discrete fixed point theorems are of the first type, and based on the following simple idea.
• The base set V is essentially finite, see Theorem 2.1 below.
• The mapping f : V → V reduces the area of candidates for fixed points.
Here, we emphasize that our theorems need no convexity assumption. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give discrete fixed point theorems. In Section 3, we apply our fixed point theorems to a class of noncooperative games and obtain some existence theorems of a Nash equilibrium of pure strategies. In Section 4, we compare our discrete fixed point theorems to conventional ones.
Throughout this paper, (V, ) is a partially ordered set and f : V → V is a nonempty set-valued mapping. The symbol x y means x y and x = y. For any x ∈ Z n , x i denotes the i-th component of x. We denote the component-wise order by . Further, x ≤ y means x y and x = y.
DISCRETE FIXED POINT THEOREMS
In this section, we present discrete fixed point theorems.
Theorem 2.1. Assume that there exist x
0 ∈ V and
Then, f has a fixed point x * , that is,
Proof. Assume that f has no fixed points. Then, x 0 x 1 . Hence, by (1), there exists x 2 ∈ f (x 1 ) such that x 1 x 2 . Since f has no fixed points, we get x 1 x 2 . Repeating this procedure, we have a sequence {x m } m∈N satisfying x m x m+1 , which contradicts that {x ∈ V ; x 0 x} is finite. Remark 2.1. When V has a minimum element x 0 , the first assumption in Theorem 2.1 is trivially satisfied.
We can easily weaken the assumptions of Theorem 2.1 as follows. Since the proof is trivial, we omit it.
Theorem 2.2. Assume that there exists a sequence {x
Theorem 2.3 below shows a way to find x 0 and x 1 such that x 0 x 1 ∈ f (x 0 ) in the case where is the component-wise order or and V is a finite set. Definition 2.1. For any k ∈ {1, . . ., n} and x ∈ Z n , we denote K := {1, . . . , k}, x K := (x i ) i∈K , K + 1 := {1, . . ., k + 1}, and x K+1 := (x i ) i∈K+1 . We call x ∈ V a fixed point of f w.r.t.
Theorem 2.3. Let V be a finite set in Z n , and assume that for any k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, x ∈ V and y ∈ f (x),
Proof. (By induction on k) Assume that f has no fixed points w.r.t. Z. Then, taking arbitrary points x ∈ V and y ∈ f (x), we have either
Without loss of generality, we may assume that x 1 < y 1 . By the assumption, there exists
Since f has no fixed points w.r.t. Z, we get y 1 < z 1 1 . Repeating this procedure, we obtain a sequence {z
, which contradicts that V is finite. Next, assume that f has a fixed point w.r.t. Z k , say, x 0 , and no fixed points w.r.t.
Here we may assume that x 0 K+1 ≤ y 0 K+1 . Therefore, by the assumption of the theorem, there exists
. Repeating this procedure, we obtain a sequence {z
for any m ∈ N, which contradicts that V is finite.
Remark 2.2.
Let σ be an arbitrary permutation of order n. Then, it is evident that one can replace K of Theorem 2.3 by {σ(1), . . ., σ(k)}.
NASH EQUILIBRIUM OF PURE STRATEGIES
As an application of our discrete fixed point theorems, we shall present a class of non-cooperative games that have a Nash equilibrium of pure strategies. We consider the following non-cooperative n-
• N := {1, . . ., n} is the set of all players.
• For any i ∈ N , S i denotes the set of player i's pure strategies. Its element is denoted by s i . We assume that each S i is a finite subset of Z.
• p i : S := n j=1 S j → R denotes the payoff function of player i.
Furthermore, we use the following notation in this section.
•
• S is equipped with a signed component-wise order, that is, N is divided into two subsets (possibly empty) N + and N − , ε j = ±1 are allocated to j ∈ N + and j ∈ N − , respectively, and s t is defined by ε j s j ε j t j for any j ∈ N . S −i = j =i S j is also equipped with the signed component-wise order.
• For any given
An n-tuple s * ∈ S is called a Nash equilibrium if s * ∈ f (s * ). As is well-known, Nash's theorem asserts that G has a Nash equilibrium if we allow mixed strategies. However, pure strategies are not enough to guarantee a Nash equilibrium. We have to impose an additional assumption to get a Nash equilibrium of pure strategies. Our assumption is monotonicity. 
1 has at most one element, and ε i s
On the other hand, for any i ∈ N 2 , we have s As a special case, let us consider the following bimatrix game.
• A = (a ij ) is a payoff matrix of player 1 (P1), that is, p 1 (i, j) = a ij .
• B = (b ij ) is a payoff matrix of player 2 (P2), that is, p 2 (i, j) = b ij .
• S 1 := {1, . . ., m 1 } is the set of pure strategies of P1, where m 1 ∈ N.
• S 2 := {1, . . ., m 2 } is the set of pure strategies of P2, where m 2 ∈ N.
• For any j ∈ S 2 , I(j) := {i * ∈ S 1 ; a i * j = max i∈S 1 a ij } is the set of best responses of P1.
• For any i ∈ S 1 , J(i) := {j * ∈ S 2 ; b ij * = max j∈S 2 b ij } is the set of best responses of P2.
• f (i, j) := I(j) × J(i) denotes the set of best responses of (i, j) ∈ S 1 × S 2 .
• A pair (i * , j * ) is a Nash equilibrium of pure strategies if (i * , j The following corollary is a direct consequence of Theorem 3.1.
Corollary 3.1. Any monotone bimatrix game has a Nash equilibrium of pure strategies.
Next, we present some examples of monotone bimatrix games.
Example 3.1. The following matrices are monotone for (ε 1 , ε 2 ) = (1, 1), where framed numbers correspond to best responses, and circled numbers correspond to the Nash equilibrium.
Indeed, the following inequalities show that A and B are monotone.
Moreover, since (i, j) = (3, 3) belongs to the set of best responses to itself, (3, 3) is a Nash equilibrium of pure strategies.
Remark 3.1. Suppose that both players test whether each payoff matrix is monotone, respectively. If they answer "yes", then the matrix game has a Nash equilibrium of pure strategies. They don't need to answer the set of their best responses. This is an advantage of Theorem 3.1. 
Therefore, the bimatrix game has a Nash equilibrium of pure strategies (2, 3).
Example 3.3.
The following matrices are not monotone for (ε 1 , ε 2 ) = (1, 1).
However, we can transform them into monotone matrices. Indeed, by exchanging the second and third columns and the third and fourth rows, A and B are transformed into A and B in Example 3.1 respectively. Thus, the original bimatrix game has a Nash equilibrium of pure strategies (4, 2).
We can weaken monotonicity so that we can deal with Example 3.4 below. 
. Therefore, by Theorem 2.2, the bimatrix game has a Nash equilibrium of pure strategies. For the sake of simplicity, we consider the case where f is single-valued. Then, since π f (x) = f (x), (2) reduces to
On the other hand, (1) in Theorem 2.1 reduces to
For example, when V consists of sixteen points as in Figures 1 and 2 , it is integrally convex. In order to apply Theorem 4.1, we have to test (3) for eight solid points in Figure 1 . On the other hands, when we apply our results, it suffices to test (4) only for one point in Figure 2 . Another advantage is that we don't need any convexity assumption on V . Yang [10] extended Theorem 4.1 by introducing a local gross direction preserving correspondence, which is weaker than direction preserving correspondence. However, his theorems also need information on eight points and convexity assumption, see [10, Definition 4.6, Theorem 3.12] for details.
Tarski gave an excellent fixed point theorem on a complete lattice, that is, every subset of the lattice has a least upper bound and a greatest lower bound. Its advantage is that V can be infinite. However, when V is finite, the assumption on the lattice seems restrictive. For example, when V is equipped with the component-wise order and has a hole as in Figure 3 , it is not a complete lattice. Indeed, since gray points are upper bounds of set U in Figure 3 , U has no least upper bound. Further, since f is not a set-valued mapping, even if one applies Theorem 4.2 to non-cooperative games, Examples 3.1, 3.2, and 3.4 are outside of his scope. Shih-Dong's fixed point theorem is a remarkable result. Since the base set of their theorem is the Boolean algebra {0, 1} n , there seems no direct relationship between their fixed point theorem and ours. Finally, we close this paper with introducing Shih-Lee's formulation [5] [6] . They provided Lefschetz type fixed points theorem for simplex mapping on some simplex not using homology theory, see [5, Theorem 2] . Moreover, they apply similar idea of [5] to prove existence of discretized economic equilibrium, see [6, Theorem 5] .
